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THE AWARENESS OF
WRONGDOING REQUIREMENTS IN
THE WAKE OF HAZELWOOD
BRIAN FLANAGAN*
ABSTRACT
State v. Hazelwood shook Alaska’s jurisprudence and suggested the end of
the due process requirement of awareness of wrongdoing for serious criminal
convictions. However, prior and subsequent case law suggest a more limited
principle that the awareness of wrongdoing requirement only applies to cases
involving omission liability or willful violation, not to the entirety of criminal
law, and Hazelwood would survive only as an extension of this distinction.
Still, premising such a requirement on judicial classification of offenses as
positive action or omission liability does not appear to have emerged by
design, and the result has the potential for inconsistency, arbitrariness, and
misapplication. This Note first demonstrates that the only recognizable
pattern to emerge from the case law is to require an awareness of wrongdoing
for omission offenses and for violations of statutes that specifically require
willful violation and second argues that the requirement of awareness of
wrongdoing should not hinge on omission versus affirmative action liability,
because it has too great a potential for arbitrary and inconsistent application.

INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Constitution prohibits the deprivation of “life, liberty,
or property without due process of law,” and guarantees a right to “fair
and just treatment in the course of legislative and executive
investigations.”1 In Speidel v. State,2 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
a felony conviction for inadvertent or negligent action violates the
defendant’s right to due process.3 The court stated that an injury could

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2013. B.S. in political
science, The University of Pennsylvania, 2010. Thank you to Bob and Tanci
Mintz for hosting me during my visit to Anchorage. Also, thank you to all of the
members of the Alaska Law Review for their support and friendship. Any
omissions or errors remain my own.
1. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 7.
2. 460 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1969).
3. Id. at 80.

FLANAGAN_V10.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

96

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

4/18/2013 1:33 PM

Vol. 30:1

only amount to a crime when the individual charged with the crime had
an “awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing.”4 The Alaska
Supreme Court has subsequently refused to impose convictions for
negligent conduct and has required a demonstration that the defendant
had an awareness of wrongdoing.5 In 1997, however, the Alaska
Supreme Court stated in State v. Hazelwood6 that negligence could serve
as the criminal intent necessary to support a conviction, and further that
the requirement to demonstrate criminal intent does not require the
State to demonstrate an awareness of wrongdoing.7
Some critics go so far as to say that Hazelwood is irreconcilable with
the Alaska jurisprudence.8 Not only does the fundamental contrast in
language support such an argument, but also no decision that cites
Hazelwood additionally cites Speidel or forbids convictions absent a
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing.9 However, other decisions since

4. Id. at 78.
5. See Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971) (holding that “[t]his
court . . . will not now sanction conviction of a serious felony for mere
inadvertence or simple neglect.”); Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska
1978) (“It is well-settled that an act or omission can result in serious criminal
liability only when a person has the requisite criminal intent.”); Hentzner v.
State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980) (“Where the crime involved may be said to
be malum in se, that is, one which reasoning members of society regard as
condemnable, awareness of the commission of the act necessarily carries with it
an awareness of wrongdoing. In such a case the requirement of criminal intent is
met upon proof of conscious action, and it would be entirely acceptable to define
the word ‘wilfully’ to mean no more than a consciousness of the conduct in
question.”).
6. 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997).
7. Id. at 878–79.
8. See Lee Perla, Note, Mens Rea in Alaska: From Bad Thoughts to No
Thoughts?, 23 ALASKA L. REV. 139, 162 (2006) (“The cases cited are not persuasive
inasmuch as they ignore Alaska’s prior jurisprudence and legislative history.”).
9. See Solomon v. State, 227 P.3d 461, 468–69 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010)
(“Solomon argues that imposition of criminal liability without proof that the
defendant had at least some level of subjective awareness of wrongdoing
violates the guarantee of due process of law. But this argument was rejected by
our supreme court in State v. Hazelwood”); Valentine v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 341–
42 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007) (“Valentine acknowledges that this court has
repeatedly held that the offense of driving while under the influence does not
require proof that the defendant was aware that he was legally impaired or that
his blood alcohol level was above the legal limit—it is enough that the defendant
knowingly drank and knowingly drove.”); Latham v. State, A-7198, 2000 WL
1124502, at *5 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2000) (“A person commits the crime of
vehicle theft in the first degree if he had no right nor any reasonable ground to
believe he had such a right and he knowingly took or drove the propelled
vehicle of another.”); Schmidt v. State, A-8669, 2005 WL 767071, at *6 (Alaska Ct.
App. Apr. 6, 2005) (“But once a person has been convicted of an offense
requiring proof of a culpable mental state, including civil negligence, factors
other than culpability govern the amount of the fine.”).
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Hazelwood continue to require that the State demonstrate that the
defendant had an “awareness of wrongdoing” or else hold that a
conviction of the defendant violates his or her right to due process.10
Consequently, despite the language of the decision, Hazelwood did not
overturn Speidel either explicitly or implicitly.
Given this history, what demonstration of criminal intent satisfies
due process, and when must the State demonstrate that the defendant
possessed an awareness of wrongdoing in order to convict him or her?
The Alaska Court of Appeals managed to create a rule, compatible with
the case law, that the defendant must possess an awareness of
wrongdoing, and therefore cannot be convicted under a negligence
theory, in two situations.11
First, the defendant cannot be convicted, absent an awareness of
wrongdoing, if the statute under which the defendant is charged
proscribes “willful” violation.12 Such a rule derives from a basic process
of statutory interpretation in that the courts simply assign meaning to
the term “willful,” and so this rule does not merit additional attention.
Second, the defendant cannot be convicted, absent an awareness of
wrongdoing, if the underlying criminal action was an omission.13 An
10. See, e.g., Dailey v. State, 65 P.3d 891, 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (“In
other words, to convict Dailey of failure to file sworn written quarterly
verifications, the State had to prove both that Dailey was aware of the
circumstances giving rise to his duty to file sworn quarterly written verifications
and that he knowingly refrained from performing that duty.”); State v. Strane, 61
P.3d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 2003); Moffitt v. State, 207 P.3d 593, 595 (Alaska Ct. App.
2009); Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 132 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Alaska Ct. App.
2006); Trigg v. State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 12,
2003); Willis v. State, 57 P.3d 688, 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Hutchison v. State,
27 P.3d 774, 778 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
11. See Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)
(“Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s use of criminal recklessness as a
measure of the criminal intent requirement applicable to Wheeler’s charges of
selling unregistered securities fully complied with the court’s duty, under
Hentzner, to inform the jury that Wheeler could be convicted only if he acted
with an awareness of wrongdoing.”); McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251, 1258–59
(Alaska 2007); Kinney v. State, 927 P.2d 1289, 1294 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); Steve
v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
12. See Wheeler, 659 P.2d at 1252 (“Accordingly, we hold that the trial court’s
use of criminal recklessness as a measure of the criminal intent requirement
applicable to Wheeler’s charges of selling unregistered securities fully complied
with the court’s duty, under Hentzner, to inform the jury that Wheeler could be
convicted only if he acted with an awareness of wrongdoing.”); McGee, 162 P.3d
at 1258–59.
13. See Steve, 875 P.2d at 122 (“The result in both cases can be explained by
the rule that, when criminal liability is predicated on a person’s failure to
perform an act required by law, the government must at a minimum show (1)
that the defendant was aware of the circumstances that created the legal duty to
act, and (2) that the defendant voluntarily refrained from performing the act.”);
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omission, in contrast to a positive action, is a “failure to act . . . or [a]
failure to act under circumstances giving rise to a legal duty to act.”14
Some would place more constitutional restrictions on the government
when the government creates omission offenses rather than positive
action offenses, because the former compels rather than forbids conduct,
and therefore imposes a greater burden on free action.15 They would
welcome an “awareness of wrongdoing” requirement for omission
offenses. However, premising an awareness of wrongdoing requirement
on whether or not an offense is a positive action or omission offense is
dangerous because a statute could be written in either form and still
proscribe or compel virtually identical conduct. As positive action and
omission offenses function more alike than not, it does not make sense
to have a different constitutional requirement for each of them. That the
Alaska Court of Appeals has already misstated positive action offenses
as omission offenses exemplifies how easily the distinction can be
blurred.16
This Note will demonstrate how the Alaska Court of Appeals’ rule
of imposing an awareness of wrongdoing requirement in cases in which
the defendant was charged under a statute that requires willful violation
or a statute that creates omission liability adequately encompasses the
case law and provides a workable estimate for when Alaska courts will
require that the State prove the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing in
order to support a conviction. However, it criticizes the emphasis on
distinguishing between positive action and omission cases.
Section I of this Note will review the history of the due process
protection of the mens rea requirement in Alaska preceding Hazelwood. It
will conclude that a rule imposing an awareness of wrongdoing
requirement in cases which premise liability on either willful violation
or omission adequately encapsulates the history of the requirement.
Section II will analyze State v. Hazelwood in the context of that case law
and will conclude that Hazelwood does not violate the rule of the Alaska
Court of Appeals, as the relevant statute in Hazelwood neither proscribed
Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294.
14. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.2 (2d ed. 2006).
15. See George P. Fletcher, On the Moral Irrelevance of Bodily Movements, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 1443, 1446 (1994) (“[P]rohibiting actions represents a lesser
incursion in our liberty than requiring particular actions (that is, punishing their
omission). As the argument goes, it is less intrusive to prohibit flag burning than
it is to require children to pledge allegiance to the flag. The former only
eliminates one of many ways of expressing contempt for the state; the latter
requires people to submit their bodies to motions dictated by the state.”).
16. See, e.g., Trigg v. State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App.
Feb. 12, 2003) (finding the court of appeals misstated section 45.55.070 of the
Alaska Statutes as an omission offense).
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willful violation nor imposed omission liability. Section III will review
the cases since Hazelwood. It again concludes that the rule adequately
encompasses the application of the requirement on the cases following
Hazelwood, and thus should serve as the rule for practitioners who later
attempt to estimate whether courts will require that the State prove the
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing. Finally, Section IV will point out
the dangers of premising a condition of awareness of wrongdoing on
omission liability.

I. THE HISTORY OF MENS REA PROTECTION IN ALASKA
This Section, divided into three Subsections, analyzes the case law
preceding State v. Hazelwood. Subsection A examines cases providing the
strongest language in support of a universal requirement of subjective
awareness of wrongdoing; Subsection B examines cases premising
liability on negligence instead of subjective awareness; Subsection C
examines the court of appeals decisions immediately preceding
Hazelwood that began to apply the awareness of wrongdoing
requirement only to offenses premised on omission liability or offenses
requiring willful violation.
A.

The Development of the Awareness of Wrongdoing Requirement

In Speidel v. State,17 the Alaska Supreme Court declared that a
felony conviction absent a criminal intent deprives the defendant of due
process of the law.18 The relevant statute in this case criminalized
individuals who “willfully neglect” to return a motor vehicle.19 The
statute additionally provided the definition of the mens rea under which
the defendant was ultimately convicted. The statute defined the mens rea
of “willfully neglects” to mean “omits, fails, or forbears, with a
conscious purpose to injure, or without regards for the rights of the
owner, or with indifference whether a wrong is done the owner or
not.”20 The Alaska Supreme Court invalidated the statute because it
permitted persons to receive a felony sentence despite having an

17. 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969).
18. Id. at 80.
19. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026(a) (1969) (“A person in possession of a motor
vehicle under an agreement in writing which requires him to return the vehicle
to a particular place or at a particular time who refuses or willfully neglects to
return it . . . is, upon conviction, punishable by imprisonment for not more than
five years.”) (current version at ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.320(a) (2012)).
20. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026(b) (1969) (current version at ALASKA STAT. §
28.35.320(b) (2012)).
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innocent mind.21 The court accepted the “with conscious purpose to
injure” part of the definition, but it rejected the criminalization of failing
to return a vehicle "without regard for the rights of the owner" or "with
indifference whether a wrong is done the owner or not." The court
reasoned that such a definition could lead to one being guilty under the
statue even in the absence of "any conscious deprivation of property or
intentional injury.”22
Ultimately, the court held that for an injury to be considered a
crime it must be “inflicted by intention,” and the defendant must have
acted with an “awareness or consciousness of some wrongdoing.”23
However, the court neither defines awareness or consciousness of
wrongdoing nor outlines how future prosecutors must prove it.
The Alaska Supreme Court would not go so far as to forbid public
welfare offenses, signaling to the legislature that it could criminalize
conduct absent awareness of culpability if the penalty were minimal and
the danger to society necessitated criminalization.24 Consequently, the
court highlighted that the penalty assigned to section 28.35.026 of the
Alaska Statutes was a felony throughout the decision.25
The statute at issue in Speidel involved a “failure to return,”
allowing future courts to interpret Speidel as requiring a showing of
more than mere negligence only for omission cases.26 However, the
Speidel court did not discuss omissions, but instead prefaced its
discussion with, “[a]lthough an act may have been objectively wrongful .
. . ,”27 signaling that the court never intended to draw such a distinction.
In 1971 the Alaska Supreme Court analyzed the awareness of

21. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 79.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 78.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 78–80 (“Under the terms of ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.026 (2012) there is
no escape from a felony conviction and a possible five-year prison term for
simple neglectful or negligent failure to return a rented automobile at the time
specified in the rental agreement. To make such an act, without consciousness of
wrongdoing or intention to inflict injury, a serious crime, and criminals of those
who fall within its interdiction, is inconsistent with the general law. To convict a
person of a felony for such an act, without proving criminal intent, is to deprive
such a person of due process of law.”).
26. See Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 122 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (“The result
in both cases [Speidel and Kimoktoak] can be explained by the rule that, when
criminal liability is predicated on a person’s failure to perform an act required
by law, the government must at a minimum show (1) that the defendant was
aware of the circumstances that created the legal duty to act, and (2) that the
defendant voluntarily refrained from performing the act.”).
27. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80 (emphasis added).
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wrongdoing requirement in Alex v. State,28 and the court held that the
awareness requirement was inherently satisfied in cases where
defendants were aware of their positive actions. It did so by first
qualifying the Speidel decision by stating that the awareness of
wrongdoing standard requires the defendant’s intent to be
“commensurate with the conduct proscribed.”29 Thus, the court rejected
a requirement of the awareness of law, but instead only required an
awareness of facts.30 Given this standard, the court upheld the
defendant’s conviction because the judge’s instruction required the jury
to find that the defendant was aware of his conduct.31
The awareness of conduct standard leaves ambiguity in negligence
statutes, specifically in whether or not one can be aware of his or her
own negligence. The court clearly did not intend to permit convictions
under a theory of negligence, stating that it would not sanction
conviction of a serious felony for mere inadvertence or simple neglect.32
Still, the court subtly shied away from assigning constitutional
protection to the awareness of wrongdoing requirement.33
Next, in Kimoktoak v. State,34 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
omission liability offenses would require the State to demonstrate the
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing. The Court found section
28.35.060 of the Alaska Statutes constitutionally defective on its face for
failing to require criminal intent.35 The court invalidated the statute
because, while it required the operator of a vehicle in an accident to give
information and provide assistance to other victims of the accident, it
did not even require the vehicle operator to know that an accident or
injuries had occurred.36 To resolve the constitutionally impermissible

28. 484 P.2d 677 (Alaska 1971).
29. Id. at 681.
30. Id. (“What is essential is not an awareness that a given conduct is a
‘wrongdoing’ in the sense that it is proscribed by law, but rather, an awareness
that one is committing the specific acts which are defined by law as a
‘wrongdoing.’”).
31. Id. at 682 (“The trial court’s instructions required the jury to find that
Alex left the Palmer camp intentionally and, therefore, with an awareness of his
conduct.”).
32. Id. at 681.
33. Id. (“The goal of these cases is to avoid criminal liability for innocent or
inadvertent conduct. The use of the phrase ‘awareness of wrongdoing’ is but one
means of assuring this result.”).
34. 584 P.2d 25 (Alaska 1978).
35. Id. at 29–30.
36. Kimoktoak, 584 P.2d at 29 (“ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.060 does not require that
a person have knowledge of the accident or of the fact that injuries have resulted
to be guilty of a serious crime. Thus, the statute appears to hold a person strictly
liable for failure to render assistance even if he is unaware of any wrongdoing,

FLANAGAN_V10.2 (DO NOT DELETE)

102

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

4/18/2013 1:33 PM

Vol. 30:1

lack of an intent requirement, the court assigned to the statute a
requirement that the driver “knowingly fails to stop and render
assistance.”37
Finally, in Hentzner v. State,38 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
“willful” violation of the Securities Act required the State to prove the
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing.39 The court distinguished the
case from Alex, as Alex involved a malum in se offense and so awareness
of conduct in that case satisfied the awareness of wrongdoing
requirement.40 However, the violation of the Securities Act in Hentzner
was a malum prohibitum offense.41 Therefore, awareness of the conduct
alone could not satisfy the awareness of wrongdoing requirement, but
instead the State must prove a separate element of the offense.42
However, the discussion over willfulness would overshadow the
discussion over malum in se versus malum prohibitum offenses. The
Alaska Supreme Court definitively stated that it would “construe
‘wilfully’ . . . to require an awareness of wrongdoing.”43 The court
asserted such a definition not simply because of due process protection,
but because of basic statutory interpretation as the Supreme Court and
other federal courts have consistently read willfully in criminal statutes
to require an awareness of wrongdoing.44 Through this straightforward

i.e., unaware of the circumstances giving rise to the duty and thus unaware that
he is in fact failing to do the required act.”).
37. Id. at 31. “Failing to do the required act” ultimately becomes the
language used to distinguish Kimoktoak as an omission liability case and thus
justifies the decision’s application only to other omission liability cases. In
Kimoktoak, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that the statute’s requirement
of an action rather than its the forbidding of an action was instrumental to the
court’s requirement that the State prove knowledge of the circumstance in order
to support a conviction. Consequently, this decision introduces the principle that
omission offenses require an awareness of wrongdoing while positive action
offenses do not. Id.
38. 613 P.2d 821 (Alaska 1980).
39. Id. at 826.
40. Id. A malum in se offense is “one in which reasoning members of society
regard as condemnable.” Id.
41. Id. A malum prohibitum offense is one in which “there is no broad societal
concurrence that it is inherently bad.” Id.
42. Id. The court took care to distinguish an awareness of wrongdoing from
an awareness of illegality, stating that the Speidel court interpreted the awareness
of wrongdoing as a purpose to injure, and, specific to securities law, alluding to
other jurisdictions which found awareness of wrongdoing as “evil motive or
purpose” and “deliberately with bad purpose.” In this sense, while an
awareness of illegality would not be necessary to demonstrate an awareness of
wrongdoing, it would be sufficient. Id. at 828.
43. Id. at 827.
44. Id. at 827, 827 n.12 (citing United States v. Murdoch, 290 U.S. 389 (1933)).
Murdoch stated that in the past fifty years the United States Supreme Court has
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discussion, Hentzner ultimately stands for the premise that a willful
violation requires an awareness of wrongdoing, regardless of omission
or positive action liability.
B.

The Move Toward A Negligence Standard

In State v. Guest, 45 the Alaska Supreme Court examined a statutory
rape statute that was silent on the matters of intent and the mistake of
fact defense. The court followed the path set in Kimotoak and read a
mistake of fact defense into the statute to avoid striking it as
unconstitutional.46 The court held that, “if an accused had a reasonable
belief that the person with whom he had sexual intercourse was sixteen
years of age or older, he may not be convicted of statutory rape.”47
Although the court does not explicitly say so, requiring a reasonable
belief as to the victim’s age effectively allows the State to overcome the
defense by showing only the defendant was negligent.
Consequently, Guest becomes a foundation for Rice and Hazelwood
in that it creates precedent for basing convictions on negligence as to a
factual circumstance, in apparent contrast with the previously discussed
case law. That the defendant may be negligent to a circumstance rather
than his conduct as a whole is no issue, because the circumstance of the
sexual partner’s age alone separates the conduct from otherwise legal
behavior, in this case consensual sexual intercourse.
In State v. Rice,48 the Alaska Supreme Court stated what it implied
in Guest, that a conviction based upon negligence about a circumstance
meets due process requirements.49 The defendant was convicted of
violating 5 Alaska Administrative Code 81.140(b), which provided: “No
person may possess or transport any game or parts of game illegally
taken.”50 The court read into the statute a requirement that the
defendant reasonably should have known that the game or parts of the
game were illegally taken.51 Conversely, “the element of negligence
must be read into 5 AAC 81.140(b).”52

repeatedly construed ‘willfully’ as used in criminal statutes to include at the
least an awareness of wrongdoing. Id. See also Spies v. United States, 317 U.S.
492, 498 (1943); United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401
U.S. 955 (1971).
45. 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
46. Id. at 838–39.
47. Id. at 839 (emphasis added).
48. 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981).
49. Id. at 110.
50. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5 § 81.140(b) (1981) (repealed 1985).
51. Rice, 626 P.2d at 110.
52. Id.
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This stands in conflict with the language and logic of the previously
mentioned cases. The circumstance of the game being illegally taken is
all that separates the conduct from the otherwise legal behavior of
transporting game. Still, because the statute in Rice, as in Guest, did not
require willful violation and did not impose omission liability, future
courts would be able to distinguish between these cases and the four
discussed in Subsection A.53
Additionally, the language in Rice leaves ample room to question
how future courts should treat the case. First, the court in Rice left
ambiguous whether or not 5 AAC 81.140(b) is a public welfare offense.
On the one hand, it is a fishing and hunting regulation, which frequently
qualifies as a public welfare offense.54 On the other, the potential penalty
for the offense is the seizure of a commercial aircraft.55 Given the
ambiguity in the range of possible penalties, it is unclear if the holdings
of previous cases like Speidel and Alex, which specifically forbid felony
convictions for negligent conduct, apply to the case.
Second, the court focuses its discussion of the constitutionality of
the conviction around a vagueness issue, rather than an awareness of
wrongdoing or other culpable mental state discussion.56 The refusal to
identify the implications this decision would have on Speidel, Alex,
Hentzner, or Kimoktoak reveals that the court might not have thought that
the principles in those cases apply, although it offers no reason for such
a conclusion other than mentioning the public welfare doctrine.
Justice Matthews, noting both of the above arguments in his
concurring opinion, wrote that the potential six month prison sentence
upon conviction of the offense distinguished the case from public
welfare offenses, and “due process requires that there be a culpable
mental state in every case where a sentence of imprisonment may be
imposed.”57 However, even Justice Matthews took no issue with
satisfying the culpability requirement by showing negligence.
Thus, to this point Speidel, Alex, Hentzner, and Kimoktoak, held that a
conviction violated the defendant’s right to due process if the State did
not demonstrate that the defendant had an awareness of wrongdoing.58

53. See McGee v. State, 162 P.3d 1251, 1258–59 (Alaska 2007); Kinney v.
State, 927 P.2d 1289, 1294 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 122
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994); Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App.
1983).
54. Rice, 626 P.2d at 108.
55. Id. at 109.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 115.
58. See Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 1980); Kimoktoak v.
State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978); Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 680–81 (Alaska
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However, the court in Guest and Rice sanctioned statutes that would
allow for the defendant to be unaware of one of the circumstances of the
offense, so long as the defendant should have been aware.59 This is
equivalent to a negligence standard, which the court expressly rejected
in Speidel60 and Alex.61
C.

The Court of Appeals Deals with the Conflicting Case Law

In Wheeler v. State,62 the Alaska Court of Appeals revisited section
45.55.210(a) of the Alaska Statutes, the statue at issue in Hentzner, and
held that the recklessness standard was an “appropriate means of
implementing the awareness of wrongdoing expressly adopted in
Hentzner.”63 The court reasoned:
The subjective component of criminal recklessness seems
entirely consistent with the awareness of wrongdoing standard.
When the accused is subjectively ‘aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk; that his conduct
may be unlawful or that it may lead to unlawful results,’ it is
difficult to imagine how he could realistically be said to have
acted without an awareness of wrongdoing.64
The court of appeals took care to state that negligence would not meet
the awareness of wrongdoing requirement, saying, “[t]he definitions
contained in the Revised Criminal Code for both recklessness—[section
of 11.81.900(a)(3) of the Alaska Statutes]—and negligence—
[11.81.900(a)(4) of the Alaska Statutes]—were expressly formulated to
preclude mere civil negligence from forming the basis for a criminal
conviction.”65 The court rejected civil negligence as a substitute for
awareness of wrongdoing because it did not to contain a subjective
aspect and it did not have its criminal counterpart’s requirement of
“gross deviation”.66
The total rejection of a negligence standard as to the circumstances
of the offense undeniably conflicts with Rice and Guest, and neither case
was cited in the decision. The complete lack of reference to those cases,

1971); Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969).
59. State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 839 (Alaska 1978); Rice, 626 P.2d at 110.
60. Speidel, 460 P.2d at 80.
61. Alex, 484 P.2d at 681.
62. Wheeler v. State, 659 P.2d 1241 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
63. Id. at 1252.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Andrew v. State, 653 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982)).
66. Id.
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which stood as controlling law, implies that the Alaska Court of Appeals
determined that such cases did not apply to the case at hand. The only
explanation for such reasoning is that the willful violation of the statute
in Wheeler implicated the awareness of wrongdoing requirement,
whereas Guest and Rice do not because those violations did not have to
be violated willfully.
In Steve v. State,67 the Alaska Court of Appeals revisited the
awareness of age issue in Guest, holding that placing the burden on the
defendant to prove the mistake of age did not violate due process
because the defendant’s awareness of the age of the victim was not an
element of the crime.68 The court took issue with strict adherence to
Speidel to the extent that “due process was violated whenever a criminal
offense did not require proof ‘that [the] one charged with criminal
conduct had an awareness of consciousness of some wrongdoing’”
because to do so would forbid crimes such as criminally negligent
homicide and many “general intent” crimes, additionally arguing that
such crimes needed to exist in a functioning criminal code.69
So, in order to allow for such crimes, the court cited Alex to
conclude that for “general intent” crimes, the defendant need only act
with an awareness of his positive act.70 It distinguished Speidel,
Kimoktoak, and Hentzner in that the defendants in those cases all were
charged with failure to act as required by law, and that the nature of the
offense as an omission rather than a positive action triggered the
awareness of wrongdoing requirement.71 It conceded that the case law
required an awareness of wrongdoing in certain situations other than
omission offenses,72 and such an argument leaves room to explain that
convictions for willful violation would also require the same awareness
of wrongdoing. By distinguishing between omission and positive action
offenses, the Alaska Court of Appeals found a rule that could reconcile
the previous case law.
In Kinney v. State,73 the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction of a defendant who asserted that his due process rights had
been violated when he did not receive a jury instruction requiring the

67. 875 P.2d 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1994).
68. Id. at 123–24.
69. Id. at 120–21 (quoting Alex v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969)).
70. Id. at 123.
71. Id. Speidel v. State imposed a duty to return the car. 460 P.2d 77, 80
(Alaska 1969). Kimoktoak v. State imposed a duty to aid. 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska
1978). Hentzner v. State imposed a duty to register the securities. 613 P.2d 821,
826 (Alaska 1980).
72. See Steve, 875 P.2d at 123.
73. 927 P.2d 1289 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996).
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prosecution to prove his awareness of the illegality of his conduct.74 The
court followed Steve in finding that because the crime, the selling of
alcohol, was a positive action (as opposed to a failure to register the sale
of alcohol), the government did not have to prove an additional mens
rea.75 There was no duty to register because the sale of liquor was
banned by a local vote in a local-option community.76 The court also
relied on Wheeler to state that the requirement of awareness of
wrongdoing differed from the requirement of awareness of illegality.77
Finally, the decision acknowledged the malum in se and malum
prohibitum distinction outlined by the supreme court in Hentzner, but did
not rest its decision on such a distinction even though the “‘broad
societal concurrence’ that the act of selling alcohol is condemnable” in a
local-option community could qualify the offense as malum in se.78
Deciding the case on such grounds was unnecessary because the
positive act of selling alcohol required no additional awareness of
wrongdoing.
Ultimately, these three Alaska Court of Appeals decisions created a
rule consistent with all of the above Alaska Supreme Court cases: a
defendant could not be convicted of a willful violation or a failure to act
unless the State proved that the defendant was aware of some
wrongdoing. In Speidel and Kimoktoak the defendants were liable for
their failure to act, and so the State had to prove their awareness of
wrongdoing.79 In Hentzner and Wheeler the defendants were charged
with willfully violating a statute, and therefore the State had to prove
their awareness of wrongdoing.80 In Alex, Guest, Rice, Steve, and Kinney,
the defendants were liable because of their positive actions and the
relevant statutes did not proscribe willful violation or otherwise impose
an additional mental state requirement for the government to
demonstrate. Consequently, the State did not have to prove the
defendants’ awareness of wrongdoing, and accordingly the defendants
were liable for their own negligence as to the consequences of their
conduct.81 The next Section discusses how Hazelwood did not
74. Id. at 1294–95.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1290. See ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.200(b) (1996).
77. Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294.
78. Id. at 1292.
79. Speidel v. State, 460 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1969); Kimoktoak v. State, 584
P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978).
80. Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 825 (Alaska 1980); Wheeler v. State, 659
P.2d 1241, 1252 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
81. See State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 110 (Alaska 1981) (finding the defendant
was guilty of games violations while using an airplane); State v. Guest, 583 P.2d
836, 839 (Alaska 1978) (finding the defendant guilty of statutory rape); Alex v.
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acknowledge this rule. However, because the court held that the
defendant did not need to have an awareness of wrongdoing to be
convicted of a positive action offense, Hazelwood did not defeat the rule
either.

II. STATE V. HAZELWOOD
This Section will discuss State v. Hazelwood, the decision that
definitively states that a defendant can be convicted for negligent
conduct without violating his or her due process rights, as there is no
requirement that the State demonstrate the defendant’s awareness of
wrongdoing.82 Subsection A explains how Hazelwood properly invoked
Rice and Guest as important precedents for the claim that a defendant
could be properly convicted for negligent conduct. Subsection B
criticizes the decision for not adequately recognizing and addressing the
Alaska Supreme Court decisions that predated Rice and Guest, as
Hazelwood blatantly conflicts with much of the language from those
cases. Finally, Subsection C concludes that despite the contrast in
language and reasoning, Hazelwood does not fundamentally conflict with
the requirement of awareness of wrongdoing in cases involving willful
violation and omission liability.
A.

Reliance on Rice and Guest

In State v. Hazelwood, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
defendant could be convicted under a theory of negligent conduct, and
that civil negligence was an acceptable standard under due process.83 In
support of its argument that negligence meets the mens rea requirement,
the court offered Guest and Rice.84 It briefly addressed the two opinions,
stating that in each case negligence was the basis of the offense.85 In
doing so, the court brushed over the fact that in those cases the
negligence only pertained to a circumstance surrounding the offense
and not the conduct itself.86 However, as the circumstance alone

State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971) (affirming the defendant’s conviction for
felony escape); Kinney, 927 P.2d at 1294 (affirming defendant’s conviction for
sale of liquor in a “local-option” community); Steve v. State, 875 P.2d 110, 123
(Alaska Ct. App. 1994) (affirming defendant’s sexual abuse of a minor).
82. State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 885 (Alaska 1997).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 879.
85. Id.
86. See id. (finding the defendant in Guest was negligent to the victim’s age,
and the defendant in Rice was negligent as to the fact that the game was illegally
taken).
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separated innocent conduct from criminal conduct, it is correct to state
that the negligence became the determinative issue.
Still, the short treatment these cases receive hides that the cases did
not fully support basing a criminal conviction on negligent conduct.
Particularly, as mentioned above, Guest did not explicitly state that the
defendant’s negligence would satisfy the mens rea requirement, and the
court in Rice did not analyze the mens rea requirement too closely
because the underlying statute mirrored a public welfare statute and
because the reasoning ultimately turned on a notice issue.
B.

Misstatement of Case Law

The Hazelwood court also downplayed the prevalence of the
awareness of wrongdoing requirement of due process in the preceding
case law, and instead argued that the due process requirement stands
for a principal of deterrence.87 To do so, it cited Alex, misquoting the
case so as to replace the Alaskan model with the federal standard.88 In its
discussion of Alex, the court made no mention of the language that
specifically states, “This court would not then and will not now sanction
conviction of a serious felony for mere inadvertence or simple neglect.”89
The Hazelwood court conceded that Speidel stands for the principal
that some cases require more than negligence, and some require less, but
it did little to offer a guideline for determining which circumstances
have which requirement, instead only offering public welfare offense as
an example that requires less.90 It alluded to a distinction between mens
rea requirements based upon serious penalties,91 but it did not rest its
decision on the fact that the statute at issue only provided for
misdemeanor rather than felony punishment.
The court also waivered on whether a statutory requirement of
mens rea, or explicit lack of requirement, trumped the due process
guarantee against a conviction without an awareness of wrongdoing. It
cited Rice and stated, “[N]o mental element will be required when a
statute provides ‘clear legislative intent to the contrary.’”92 Additionally,
87. Id. at 884.
88. See id. at 879 (quoting Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971)
(“The requirement of criminal intent does ‘not emphasize a specific awareness of
wrongfulness.’”)). The full language from Alex refers to the federal standard as
opposed to the Alaska standard, and reads, “[T]he [United States] Supreme
Court did not emphasize a specific awareness of wrongfulness.” 484 P.2d at 681.
89. Alex, 484 P.2d at 681.
90. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 879–80.
91. See id. at 880 (“As a corollary, a mens rea requirement is imputed only
when a serious penalty attaches.”).
92. Id. (quoting State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 108 (Alaska 1981)).
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the court stated, “[e]ven Morissette concedes that the concerns raised by
the exclusion of mens rea ‘would not justify judicial disregard of a clear
command to that effect from Congress.’”93 On the other hand, the court
limited the power of the legislature, stating, “[a]n exception to the mens
rea requirement for ‘clear legislative intent to the contrary’ has the
potential to swallow the rule. As we said in Speidel, even where a statute
is explicit, due process will on occasion require a higher degree of
culpability.”94
The court in Hazelwood then explained what it believed to be the
reasoning behind the due process requirement of mens rea. In doing so it
cited neither case law nor legal theory, stating:
Society’s interest in obtaining compliance with its regulations . .
. can never outweigh the individual’s interest in freedom from
substantial punishment for a violation he or she could not
reasonably have been expected to avoid. The threshold
question, then, is whether the defendant’s conduct is
something which society could reasonably expect to deter.95
The court simply stated that negligence met this goal.96 Other than its
brief recognition of Guest and Rice, it did not explain why, but merely
battled with the argument that a civil standard is inappropriate for
criminal sanctions.97
The court outlined three circumstances in which due process would
not require not require a “separate mental element.”98 First, the court
noted, “Persons operating in rule-laden environments, and whose
actions have a substantial impact on public health, safety, or welfare, can
reasonably be assumed aware of their governing codes.”99 The court
said this in support of strict liability for highly regulated areas, a
proposition offered in Cole v. State.100 Second, the court returned to the
Hentzner distinction that malum in se offenses inherently contain an
awareness of wrongdoing.101 Finally, the court stated that an awareness
of wrongdoing might not be required when the penalty is only a small
fine under the public welfare offense theory that has been permitted

93.
(1952)).
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 882 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 n.14
Id. (quoting Speidel v. State, 46 P.2d 77, 80 (1969)).
Id. at 883.
See id. at 883–85.
See id. at 883–84.
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id. (citing Cole v. State, 828 P.2d 175, 178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)).
Id. at 883–84 (citing Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 826 (Alaska 1980)).
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since Speidel.102 However, after giving these circumstances, the court did
not state that any of them apply to the facts at hand. This questions the
relevancy of the discussion, leaving only the possibility that the court
listed these circumstances in order to suggest that the due process
protection can be limited when circumstances require it. Ultimately,
such a discussion exemplifies the shortcomings in this decision: it
inadequately summarizes and relies upon case law and engages in lofty
discussion without applying the conclusion to the facts at hand.103
C.

Hazelwood Overall

Despite the apparent contrast between Hazelwood and the preceding
case law, the facts of Hazelwood do not disturb the formulated rule that
emerged from the decisions of the court of appeals: the State must prove
the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing when the relevant statute
involves either willful violation or omission liability. In Hazelwood, the
defendant committed a positive action and the statute required no
willful violation.104
Unfortunately, Hazelwood neither mentioned nor relied upon the
rule that the awareness of wrongdoing requirement would only apply in
such cases. Instead, the Hazelwood court proposed a new test, asking
“whether the defendant’s conduct is something which society could
reasonably expect to deter.”105 Despite the Alaska Supreme Court
offering this new test, the subsequent due process cases continued to
follow the rule outlined above as it existed before Hazelwood.

III. RECENT CASES
In the supreme and appellate court cases following Hazelwood, the
inconsistencies between that case and Speidel, Alex, Kimoktoak, and
Hentzner were clear. All were still good law, as each continued to be
cited, but no case that cited Hazelwood cited any of the other four.106 For
the most part, the distinction previously made by the court of appeals
between omission and positive action liability held. Subsection A will
show that cases that required an awareness of wrongdoing either
involved omission liability or willful violation. Likewise, Subsection B
will show that courts upheld negligence liability in the case of positive

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 883–84.
For an additional critique of Hazelwood, see Perla, supra note 8, at 153–57.
See Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 878.
Id. at 883.
And, intuitively, vice versa.
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actions. However, Subsection C will discuss how possession liability
proved difficult to classify as a positive action or omission case. Finally,
Subsection D will analyze how the court of appeals incorrectly
characterized flight as a failure to stop in Melson v. Municipality of
Anchorage.107
A.

Awareness of Wrongdoing Cases

After Hazelwood, the court of appeals first returned to due process
analysis without employing the “reasonably expect to deter” standard in
Dailey v. State.108 In Dailey, the court considered the requirement of
awareness of wrongdoing for a conviction for the defendant’s failure to
file quarterly written verification of sex offender registration.109 The
court cited Speidel, Alex, and Hentzner to show that the State had a duty
to prove the defendant “was aware that he had a duty to act.”110 The
court of appeals explicitly found that requirement necessary, “because
Dailey was prosecuted for a failure to act.”111 Consequently, omission
liability triggered the requirement of awareness of circumstances,
without which the State could not adequately prove the defendant’s
culpable mental state.
Later, in Doe v. State,112 the Alaska Supreme Court cited Hentzner in
order to demonstrate that for mala in se offenses, awareness of the
conduct suffices for an awareness of wrongdoing.113 The Doe v. State
court acknowledged the continued existence of the awareness of
wrongdoing requirement, but did not analyze the issue further because
the case ultimately turned on an ex post facto issue.114
In contrast, in McGee v. State,115 the Alaska Supreme Court
discussed the effect of removing “willfulness” from a criminal statute.116
McGee cited Hentzner to state that “willfully” had a recognized
understanding as “requiring the state to prove either a conscious
‘awareness of wrongdoing’ or the intentional commission of ‘an
unlawful act without justification or other legal excuse.’”117 So, while the
old version of a statute—proscribing willful violation—permitted a
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

60 P.3d 199 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
65 P.3d 891 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003).
Id. at 894.
Id.
Id. at 895.
189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008).
Id. at 1012–13.
See id. at 1019.
162 P.3d 1251 (Alaska 2007).
Id. at 1258–59.
Id. at 1258.
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mistake of fact defense, the new version of the statute—without the term
“willful”—would only permit a mistake of fact defense if the
defendant’s mistake was reasonable.118
In so doing, the Alaska Supreme Court solidified one half of the
court of appeals’ rule that the State would have to demonstrate the
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing if the defendant were charged
with a willful violation. Removing “willful” from a positive action
statute removed the requirement of showing a subjective awareness of
wrongdoing.
The court further cemented the subjective awareness and
willfulness standard in State v. Strane.119 In that case, the court analyzed
the liability of a defendant who violated a protective order but believed
the order would not apply if the protected party consented.120 The
defendant sought to invoke Hentzner but the court responded that in
Hentzner, “while recognizing the ‘awareness of wrongdoing’ standard as
one that would certainly pass constitutional muster, [the court] stopped
short of holding that this particular culpable mental state was
constitutionally necessary.”121 Under this reasoning, Hentzner required
an awareness of wrongdoing element not because of the constitution,
but because of the statute under which the defendant was convicted,
thus confirming that “willful” triggered the subjective awareness of
wrongdoing requirement. As the violation of the protection order was a
positive action, and the violation did not require willfulness, a
conviction did not need an additional showing of subjective awareness
of wrongdoing. The State demonstrated that the defendant was aware of
his conduct and aware of the order, in violation of the statute. Since the
State had no burden to prove anything else, the defendant’s mistake of
law was irrelevant.122
Next, in Hutchison v. State,123 the court of appeals considered the
defendant’s willful failure to appear at his scheduled court date.124 The
court cited Hentzner for the following proposition:

118. Id. at 1258–59.
119. 61 P.3d 1284 (Alaska 2003).
120. Id. at 1285.
121. Id. at 1291.
122. Id. at 1292 (“We know of no decision from the domestic violence arena
supporting Strane’s position. And as the court of appeals observed in Strane,
courts ruling in the analogous area of criminal contempt routinely apply a
culpable mental state of reckless disregard, a standard less demanding on the
prosecution than consciousness of wrongdoing, and one that does not permit
defenses based on either a pure mistake of law or a good faith but unreasonable
mistake of fact.”).
123. 27 P.3d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
124. Id. at 775.
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[T]he crime of failure to appear involves an omission to
perform a duty—for, in such situations, the definition of
‘willfulness’ must encompass not only the need to prove the
voluntariness or purposefulness of the defendant’s conduct,
but also the need to prove the defendant’s awareness of the
duty in the first place.125
Such a statement implies that the awareness of wrongdoing did not
apply to all cases, but instead applied specifically to omission liability
and willful violation cases. Ultimately, the court acquitted the defendant
because the defendant did not act with the conscious purpose of
avoiding his obligation to appear.126
In Trigg v. State,127 the court of appeals considered the defendant’s
failure to register as a sex offender.128 The court cited Kimoktoak,
Wheeler,129 and Steve, in support of “the principle that a person can be
punished for failing to engage in specific conduct only if the person was
aware of the circumstances that triggered the duty to engage in that
conduct.”130 Again, in taking such care to make this distinction, the court
implied that punishment for engaging in conduct, in contrast to failing
to act, does not have an equally stringent requirement of awareness of
circumstances. The court refused to resolve whether recklessness or
knowledge satisfied the awareness of circumstances requirement.131
Finally, in Willis v. State,132 the court of appeals considered the
awareness of two parents convicted of “recklessly caus[ing] serious
physical injury to [their child].”133 Because the prosecutors could not
determine which parent assaulted the child, the State advanced a theory
that one defendant assaulted the child and the other failed to protect the
child.134 Because the State pursued a failure to act theory, the court relied
on Kimoktoak, stating, “[m]ore specifically, when a defendant is
prosecuted for failing to act, the State must show that the defendant was

125. Id. at 778.
126. Id. at 782.
127. A-7519, 2003 WL 294363 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003).
128. Id. at *1.
129. The Alaska Court of Appeals summarized Wheeler as a case about the
defendant’s failure to register, rather than the defendant’s sale of unregistered
securities. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *3.
132. 57 P.3d 688 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
133. Id. at 690.
134. Id. at 693 (“Judge Weeks gave the jurors an instruction that combined
both theories of criminal responsibility—i.e., responsibility based on personal
commission of an assault, and responsibility for failing to act to prevent the
assault.”).
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aware of the circumstance that triggered the duty to act and that, being
aware of this circumstance, the defendant chose to do nothing—i.e.,
‘knowingly’ refrained from acting.”135 Again the court of appeals held
that the omission liability triggered the requirement of awareness of
circumstances.
B.

Cases Citing Hazelwood

Four cases have cited Hazelwood regarding the criminal requirement
of awareness of wrongdoing. The relevant statutes consistently
proscribe positive conduct and do not require willful violation; therefore
negligence satisfies any constitutional requirement of a criminal mental
state.
The court of appeals cited Hazelwood approvingly in Solomon v.
State,136 upholding a DUI conviction under a negligence theory.137 The
defendant asserted that he had no knowledge of his intoxication, and
therefore should not be subject to criminal punishment.138 However, the
court held that the defendant was at least negligent as to his
intoxication, and therefore could face criminal punishment.139 It made
no mention of a requirement mandating awareness of wrongdoing, but
it specifically stated that Hazelwood allowed for a conviction without a
showing of what the defendant subjectively realized, and instead allows
for convictions on only a negligence theory.140
Another DUI case, Valentine v. State,141 mirrors Solomon in that the
defendant attempted to use Hazelwood to require that the State
demonstrate that he was at least negligent as to his intoxication.142 The
court of appeals acknowledged that Hazelwood stood for the premise that
the State must prove the defendant’s negligence as to an attendant
circumstance, but, like Solomon, the court of appeals found that his
negligence was assumed because the defendant knowingly consumed

135. Id. at 694.
136. 227 P.3d 461 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010).
137. Id. at 468 (“[T]here must be some level of mental culpability on the part
of the defendant. However, this principle does not preclude a civil negligence
standard.”).
138. Id. at 464.
139. Id. at 469.
140. Id. at 468.
141. 155 P.3d 331 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007), rev’d 215 P.3d 319 (Alaska 2009).
142. Id. at 342–43 (For instance, the court in Morgan v. Anchorage explained
“[i]t certainly does not make sense to allow a defendant to claim that his
intentional consumption of alcohol impaired his ability to know that he was
intoxicated.”).
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enough alcohol to become legally intoxicated.143
The court of appeals also considered the defendant’s negligence in
the context of vehicular theft in Latham v. State.144 The relevant statute
criminalized the taking of a vehicle if the defendant “ha[d] no right to do
so or any reasonable ground to believe the person ha[d] such a right.”145
The defendant argued that the State must prove at least recklessness as
to the circumstance of his right to take the vehicle, as mandated by
section 11.81.610(b) of the Alaska Statutes.146 However, the court of
appeals reasoned that section 11.81.610(b) did not apply because
Hazelwood stood for the principle that “ordinary negligence is the
included mental state where a defendant is permitted to assert a
reasonable but mistaken belief as a defense to criminal charges.”147
Because the statute implicitly provided for a negligence standard,
section 11.81.601(b) did not apply, and because the statute criminalized a
positive act, there was no constitutional requirement of a greater
awareness than negligence.
In Schmidt v. State,148 the court of appeals considered the liability of
a defendant “convicted of seven fish and game violations related to
taking two moose and one brown bear . . . . [Six of the violations]
required proof that he was not an Alaska resident, and that he was at
least negligent in claiming that he was an Alaska resident.”149 The court
cited Hazelwood to demonstrate that the negligence theory is sufficient to
deter Schmidt and others from similar offenses.150 Again, as this statute
forbade positive acts under a negligence theory, it did not implicate any
awareness of wrongdoing or circumstances requirements.
The four above cases all upheld negligence convictions based on a
positive action, and did not involve a statutory requirement of willful
violation.151 In contrast, the cases in the previous subsection that
involved willful violation or omission liability did still require that the
State prove an awareness of wrongdoing.152 Therefore, the court of

143. Id.
144. A-7198, 2000 WL 1124502 (Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2000).
145. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.360(a) (2000).
146. Latham, 2000 WL 1124502, at *5.
147. Id.
148. A-8669, 2005 WL 767071 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2005).
149. Id. at *1.
150. Id. at *6.
151. See Solomon v. State, 227 P.3d 461, 468 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010); Valentine
v. State, 155 P.3d 331, 342–43 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007); Schmidt, 2005 WL 767071, at
*6; Latham, 2000 WL 1124502, at *5.
152. See Dailey v. State, 65 P.3d 891, 895 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003); Trigg v.
State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2003); Willis v.
State, 57 P.3d 688, 695 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Hutchison v. State, 27 P.3d 774,
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appeals’ rule on when to apply the awareness of wrongdoing
requirement discussed in Section II survived Hazelwood and continues to
be in effect in Alaska. Following this rule provides the best guidance for
when the courts will require the State to prove the defendant’s
awareness of wrongdoing.
C.

The Third Track—Possession Liability

However, Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage does not fit the above
mold. In a case decided ten years after Hazelwood, the Alaska Court of
Appeals overturned the defendant’s conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia, finding that it violated the defendant’s due process right
because the relevant statute did not require a culpable mental state.153
Section 08.35.010 of the Alaska Statutes defines drug paraphernalia as:
[A]ny items [sic] whose objective characteristics or objective
manufacturer’s design indicate that it is intended for use in the
consumption, ingestion, inhalation, injection or other method
of introduction of a controlled substance into the human body
or to facilitate a violation of AS 11.71. [A]ny item where
circumstances reasonably indicate that the subjective intent of
[its] possessor is to use it or sell it for the consumption,
ingestion, inhalation, injection or other method of introduction
of a controlled substance into the human body or to facilitate a
violation of AS 11.71.154
The court recognized that it could follow the United States Supreme
Court and construe such a definition narrowly so as to limit the statute
as much as possible in order to only prosecute for possession of items
which, “by virtue of [their] objective features, i.e. features designed by
[their] manufacturer [are] principally used with illegal drugs”155 or to
require proof that the defendant intentionally displayed the item “in a
manner that appeal[ed] to or encourage[ed] illegal drug use.”156
However, the court of appeals reasoned that while such a solution may
survive the national standard, it still did not survive the Alaska due
process requirement of awareness of wrongdoing.157 Specifically, the
782 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
153. Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 132 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2006).
154. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE § 08.35.010 (2006).
155. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
501 (1982).
156. Id. at 502.
157. See Myers, 132 P.3d at 1186. The court further stated that it falls outside
of its scope to rewrite the provision to meet due process requirements. Id.
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court took issue with the language involving “the subjective intent of
[the] possessor” because it:
[A]llows a defendant to be convicted of the sale or possession
of drug paraphernalia when, given the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe, or think it likely, that the
defendant intended to use or sell the item to accomplish or
further the unlawful introduction of a controlled substance into
the human body–regardless of whether the defendant actually
intended this.158
The court emphasized the part of the statute describing a
circumstance which would identify an item as drug paraphernalia as
“[d]irect or circumstantial evidence of [the possessor’s] intent . . . to
deliver [the item] to persons who [the possessor] . . . should reasonably
[know] intend to use the object to facilitate a violation of [the state drug
laws].”159 Myers held that this language essentially created a negligence
standard.160 The court made the following distinction between negligent
and reckless mens rea that proved instrumental in its rejection of the
former: “‘reasonable indication’ is not being used as circumstantial
evidence of the defendant’s true intention. Rather, ‘reasonable
indication’ is all that must be proved.”161
The court reiterated the due process guarantee that the State must
show that the defendant acted with some awareness of wrongdoing, and
then cited Hentzner, Kimoktoak, Alex, and Speidel in support of this
principle, noticeably ignoring Rice, Guest, and Hazelwood.162
If Hazelwood, Rice, and Guest (followed by Valentine, Solomon,
Schmidt, and Latham) apply to positive action cases, while Speidel,
Hentzner, and Kimoktoak (followed by Dailey, Hutchison, Trigg, and Willis)
apply to omission liability, then perhaps Myers creates precedent that
possession liability, like omission liability and unlike positive action
liability, would require an awareness of wrongdoing in order to support
a conviction.163

158. Id. at 1184.
159. Id. (quoting ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE § 08.35.010 (2006)).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1185.
162. Id. at 1185 n.17.
163. The comments to the Model Penal Code contain some language
analogizing possession to omission liability. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) cmt. 4
(1985) (“An actor who is aware of his control of the thing possessed for a period
that would enable him to terminate control has failed to act in the face of a legal
duty imposed by the law that makes his possession criminal.”). See also JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 97 (5th ed. 2009) (“‘possession’ is
equivalent to an omission, in which the defendant has a statutory duty to
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As the Alaska Court of Appeals applied the same awareness of
wrongdoing requirement to possession liability offenses that it had
reserved for omission liability offenses, it appears that it also considered
possession liability a form of omission liability. Taking such an
approach, Myers provides yet another example of how to remedy the
apparent contradictions in the case law through separating omission and
positive action liability.
D.

Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage

Finally, in Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage,164 the court of
appeals considered the defendant’s awareness in his conviction for his
“resisting or interfering with a police investigation by fleeing after
having been told to stop.”165 The court cited Kimoktoak in its holding that
the municipality must have shown that defendant was aware of the
command to stop.166 Here, however, the defendant’s flight was a
positive act, and therefore should not have required an awareness of
circumstances. Thus, this case stands in stark contrast to the developed
rule.
However, in reaching its decision, the court of appeals cited
Kimoktoak as a case where the defendant was “convicted of leaving the
scene of an accident.”167 While that is perhaps a common summary of
the offense, the defendant in Kimoktoak violated section 28.35.060 of the
Alaska Statutes, “Duty of operator to give information and render
assistance,”168 and to classify that statute as leaving the scene of an
accident is to disregard the nature of the offense as a crime by omission.
Thus, Melson suffers from one of two defects: either the court
mischaracterized Kimoktoak as a positive action offense and consequently
decided this case using a misunderstanding of the precedent, or it found
the distinction between positive action liability and omission liability
inconsequential to the awareness of wrongdoing requirement. Either
way, the decision, if followed in future cases, would destroy the rule
used in the previous decisions. The result would leave practitioners with
no way to reconcile cases like Strane and Trigg, much less Speidel and
Hazelwood.
Perhaps for this reason, Melson has not been widely followed, as

dispossess herself of the property”).
164. 60 P.3d 199 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
165. Id. at 201.
166. Id. at 203.
167. Id.
168. Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 29 (Alaska 1978).
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Dailey, Doe, McGee, Strane, Trigg, Solomon, Valentine, and Schmidt were all
decided after the case. Even within Melson, the awareness of the
command to stop received minimal attention, and could have easily
been resolved through statutory interpretation169 rather than the due
process argument that underlies the other cases. Instead of shattering
the rule that the State must prove the defendant’s awareness of
wrongdoing in willful violation and omission liability cases but not in
others, this case better serves as an example of how easy it is to blur the
distinction between omission liability and positive action liability. The
court of appeals in this case misclassified the underlying offense in
Hentzner as fleeing the scene rather than failing to stop and render aid,
while the offense in this case, resisting arrest, operated much more as a
failure to stop than a positive action. The ease with which positive action
and omission liability can be blurred demonstrates the fundamental
flaw with the functioning distinction.

IV. THE ACTUS REUS SHOULD NOT DETERMINE THE MINIMAL
LEVEL OF MENS REA
The case law divisions of positive action, omission liability, and
possession liability do not seem to come from an intent to place
additional requirements on omission and possession liability, but rather
from the courts simply trying to make a rule to reconcile the conflicting
results in the jurisprudence. While the distinction between omission and
positive action liability satisfies stare decisis, it should not continue to
serve as the functioning rule, if for no other reason than the potential for
confusion as demonstrated in Melson. To premise a constitutional
requirement on such an easily blurred distinction can create
unmanageable ambiguity and lead to otherwise insignificant changes in
phrasing that alter the rights of defendants.
First, difficulty can arise even in the simple step of attempting to
identify omission liability. The definition of the term ranges from
“omissions are the willed absence of bodily movements, or willed
nonmotion”170 to “[i]llegal omissions are simply the failure to do what is
required by law.”171 Using the former definition, a violation of section
28.35.060 of the Alaska Statutes, as seen in Kimoktoak, might not qualify
as an omission: a defendant who drives away from the scene of the

169. Either through reading the term “recklessly,” which is already in the
statute, or through applying section 11.81.610(b) of the Alaska Statutes.
170. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1444.
171. Patricia Smith, Legal Liability and Criminal Omissions, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
69, 69 (2001).
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accident would be committing a positive act in that they would be
willing their motion. However, the second definition is clearly more
applicable, because the conduct that the legislature intended to
incriminate through such a statute is the failure to give information and
to render assistance. Overall, the range in definitions demonstrates the
dangers of premising an awareness requirement on a term with varying
meaning because of the potential for inconsistent results.
Second, the traditional arguments for distinguishing between
omission and positive action liability do not apply in a number of these
cases. Some proponents of clearly distinguishing omission liability from
positive action liability argue:
[T]hat prohibiting actions represents a lesser incursion in our
liberty than requiring particular actions (that is, punishing their
omission). As the argument goes, it is less intrusive to prohibit
flag burning than it is to require children to pledge allegiance
to the flag. The former only eliminates one of many ways of
expressing contempt for the state; the latter requires people to
submit their bodies to motions dictated by the state.172
However, the cases of Wheeler and Hentzner provide examples of
how a slight change of wording would switch the offense from a
positive action offense to an omission offense, without changing the
quantity of conduct proscribed. As written, the statute invoked in those
cases, section 45.55.070 of the Alaska Statutes, proscribed the sale of a
security unless it was registered.173 However, the statute could easily
have been written as, “a person shall register all securities that the
person offers for sale. Failure to do so . . .” The language would
proscribe and compel virtually the same conduct, but would face
different awareness requirements under the current jurisprudence. That
the Alaska Court of Appeals in Trigg misstated section 45.55.070 of the
Alaska Statutes as an omission offense further exemplifies how the
distinction has been blurred, and how the fundamental reasoning for
making such a distinction has lost its meaning.174
Third, as the awareness of circumstances and awareness of conduct
argument was championed as an effort “to avoid criminal liability for
innocent or inadvertent conduct,”175 distinguishing between positive
action and omission liability often does not accomplish that goal. An
172. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1446.
173. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.070 (1983).
174. See Trigg v. State, A-7519, 2003 WL 294363, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Feb.
12, 2003) (stating that the issue is whether knowingly describes the conduct of
failing to register or the awareness of the duty to register).
175. Alex v. State, 484 P.2d 677, 681 (Alaska 1971).
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individual can cause harm, and therefore not be innocent, through nonaction just as easily as through action.176 Critics have offered numerous
hypotheticals in which inaction greatly mirrors action and in which the
culpability of a non-actor appears as great as a positive actor. For
example, “[a] mother’s failure to feed her child is readily treated as the
affirmative act of neglect or starvation, and thus virtually every Western
legal system would include this case within the ambit of criminal
homicide. Whether the mother remains motionless as the baby dies is
totally irrelevant.”177 In such an example, the harm caused is the focus
and is what qualifies the mother as a guilty individual, rather than any
specific action or non-action, and it is pointless to create a rule that if the
mother caused the death through inaction she has more due process
rights for the prosecution to overcome than if the mother caused the
death through some action. Willis demonstrates this point because the
relevant statute focused on the result, not the means in which it was
achieved. Because the prosecution pursued a theory of omission liability
it faced an additional hurdle of demonstrating the awareness of the
circumstances of the defendants’ inaction.178 When the harm caused
rather than the manner in which the defendant caused it determines the
culpability of the defendant, premising a due process protection on
whether the defendant committed an action or failed to act does not
further the goal of protecting innocent behavior.
Two sets of comparisons between cases already introduced
highlight these arguments. First, the defendant in Rice was convicted
despite only being negligent to what he was transporting.179 In contrast,
the defendant in Myers could not be convicted because of his negligence

176. See Smith, supra note 171, at 83–84. “At the same time, however, it must
also be acknowledged that ‘allowing’ (like ‘causing’) is a success verb, that is,
you cannot let something happen unless it happens. In other words, it is
necessarily the case that if you let something happen, it happened. This point
creates some tension with the idea that allowing something to happen is nothing
more than the absence of a potential causal factor, but it must be included in a
full account because it is a conceptually necessary feature of what it means to let
something happen.” Id.
177. Fletcher, supra note 15, at 1448.
178. See Willis v. State, 57 P.3d 688, 690 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (“[T]he
indictment was based on the theory that one of them had personally assaulted
the infant while the other had knowingly stood by and allowed the assault to
happen—thus violating their parental duty to protect the child and rendering
them criminally liable for the resulting injuries.”).
179. State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104, 110 (Alaska 1981). The court argued that such
reasoning was necessary in order to promote the legitimate, regulatory purpose
of the statute. Any other interpretation would be inapposite to the statute’s aims.
Id.
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as to the items he was possessing.180 Does the fact that the defendant in
Rice was moving transform the action so much that the two statutes
invoke two different liability regimes? An advocate of the distinction
would answer affirmatively, pointing to the nature of moving the illicit
cargo as an act that, whether the defendant knows it or not, furthers a
criminal enterprise in some trafficking sense. However, drawing the line
at basic, unwitting motion between these two crimes seems too arbitrary
to create such a distinction between such similar offenses.
Second, comparing Melson to Kimoktoak, the court of appeals
required the same level of awareness of both offenses; in one case the
defendant failed to stop at the order of a police officer, while in the other
the defendant failed to stop at a scene of an accident.181 In both cases
penalizing a defendant who did not know of the circumstances, the
order to stop or the occurrence of an accident, seemed patently unfair,
and so the court of appeals in Melson applied the same requirement as
did the supreme court in Kimoktoak. However, if this distinction between
omission and positive action were to be more firmly cemented in case
law, the defendant in Melson might have faced different awareness
requirements because he was not convicted of the omission of failing to
stop, but rather the positive action of fleeing. This change, though small,
alters the liability of the defendant and the minimal awareness that the
State must prove.
Classifying an act as fleeing rather than failing to stop, or leaving
the scene rather than failing to give aid, is too arbitrary a distinction.
That the court of appeals in Melson misstated the underlying conduct in
Kimoktoak as a positive action offense demonstrates the potential for
misapplication. The potential for inconsistency exemplifies why
Alaska’s jurisprudence should not premise an awareness of wrongdoing
requirement on a term as difficult to define and as morally irrelevant as
omission liability. However, without such a reliance on omission
liability, the courts would face the difficult task of explaining the
rivaling case law.

CONCLUSION
The rule that the prosecution must prove the defendant’s
awareness of wrongdoing in cases involving willful violation or
omission liability effectively distinguishes conflicting cases such as

180. Myers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 132 P.3d 1176, 1185 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2006).
181. See Melson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 60 P.3d 199, 203 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2002) (“[T]he actus reus of this offense is the defendant’s act of flight”).
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Speidel and Hazelwood. This rule has largely been followed since
Hazelwood, has expanded to include possession liability within omission
liability, and provides the best guideline for practitioners to follow to
determine when the courts will require the State to prove the
defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing.
However, the part of the rule that premises the requirement to
demonstrate the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing on omission
liability should be abandoned: distinguishing between positive action
and omission often fails to make meaningful distinctions between
conduct committed by the defendant, freedoms restricted by the
government, or innocence of the defendant. Consequently, following
this rule already has and will continue to give due process protection to
defendants in some cases but not in other substantially similar ones.
Therefore, the courts must decide if requiring the prosecution to
demonstrate the defendant’s awareness of wrongdoing is worthy of
universal application, total abandonment, or a new rule that would
provide for a more reasoned selection of when to apply the requirement.
Until that time, the existing rule, even if partially based upon an
arbitrary distinction, allows lawyers to distinguish between
fundamentally conflicting cases and provides an estimate of when
future courts will require the State to prove the defendant’s awareness
of wrongdoing.

